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NATO AS AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION: TEN
BRIEF OBSERVATIONS
Niels Blokker*
1. In recent years, the NATO legal community has become more outward
looking, as reflected in the NATO legal conferences, courses at the NATO
Defense College in Rome and the NATO School in Oberammergau (Germany),
the NATO Legal Gazette, and also in the participation of NATO lawyers in
major international law gatherings.1 NATO legal advisers and SHAPE lawyers
have made important contributions in this respect.
This intensified external orientation is necessary for two main reasons, the
“input reason” and the “output reason.” First: it informs the outside legal world
better about NATO and NATO legal issues. Second: NATO is better informed
about the output of the outside legal world—many new developments in
international law are relevant for NATO and the NATO legal community must
be aware of these developments. In a way, members of the NATO legal
community are “NATO legal ambassadors.” They are the legal eyes, ears, and
mouths of NATO in the wider community of international lawyers. Oscar
Schachter has referred to this epistemic community as the “invisible college of
international lawyers.”2
2. One area within public international law in which important new
developments have taken place over the last few decades is in the law of
international organizations. It is obvious that new developments in this area are
important for NATO, since NATO is an international organization. While it is
always emphasized that NATO is a political and military alliance, NATO is also
an international organization. Therefore, a number of general characteristics,
legal issues etc., that apply to—or are relevant for—international organizations
in general, apply also to—or are also relevant for—NATO. If this is further
analyzed, it may clarify legal opportunities and limitations for NATO.

*
Professor of International Institutional Law (Schermers Chair), Grotius Centre for International Legal
Studies, Leiden University, The Netherlands. The following article is a slightly elaborated version of the author’s
oral remarks at the SHAPE workshop. See Niels Blokker, Oral Remarks at SHAPE Workshop: Tackling 21st
Century Challenges Faced by International Organizations (May 6, 2015).
1
See NATO Defense College, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG., http://www.ndc.nato.int; NATO School
Oberammergu, NATO SCHOOL, https://www.natoschool.nato.int; The NATO Legal Gazette, NORTH ATLANTIC
TREATY ORG., https://www.act.nato.int/publications-lg (last visited July 14, 2019);
2
Oscar Schachter, The Invisible College of International Lawyers, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 217, 217 (1977).
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3. In looking at NATO as an international organization, it is necessary to
take a dynamic perspective. First of all, this is necessary because NATO has
changed fundamentally since it was created seventy years ago.3 However,
international organizations have also changed fundamentally. Paragraphs 4 and
5 will briefly elaborate these two elements.
4. NATO has changed fundamentally following its creation in 1949 as a
collective self-defense organization.4 At the time, it was given a very thin
institutional structure. Article 9 of the North Atlantic Treaty established the
Council, instructed the Council to “establish immediately a defence committee,”
and empowered the Council to set up other subsidiary bodies.5 The North
Atlantic Treaty did not provide for the creation of a Secretariat and a SecretaryGeneral.6 It is difficult to believe that it has been possible to develop NATO into
the complex military and political organization that it is today, without any
amendments to its founding instrument. Today, NATO is much more than a
collective self-defense organization, as it is carrying out a number of “crisis
management”—out of area—operations.7 Membership has expanded, and the
organization now has fully-fledged institutional structures.
5. At the same time, NATO is not unique in this. Most international
organizations have changed fundamentally during their existence. In order to be
able to perform their functions, international organizations themselves need to
change, to adapt to the changing international milieu. During the April 2015
annual meeting of the American Society of International Law, one of the panels
discussed the question to what extent international organizations are capable of
adapting to change.8 The answer given by all panelists was that in their
experience international organizations are very well able to do so.9 There are
different legal techniques that make this possible, many more than only the
formal amendment of treaties: implied powers, the notions of practice of the
organization and “established practice of the organization,” various methods of

3

See North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 24.
See id.
5
See id. art. 9.
6
See id.
7
Crisis Management, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG., (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/
natohq/topics_49192.htm
8
See Adapting to Change: The Role of International Organizations, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INT’L LAW,
(Apr. 10, 2015), [hereinafter Adapting to Change: Video] https://www.asil.org/resources/video/2015-annualmeeting; Adapting to Change: The Role of International Organizations, 109 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 277,
277–90 [hereinafter Adapting to Change: Transcript].
9
See id.
4
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interpretation, the “presumption of legality” mentioned by the International
Court of Justice in its 1962 Certain Expenses Advisory Opinion, etc.10 NATO is
an excellent example of an international organization demonstrating that it is
capable to adapt to a changing international—security—environment.
6. Over the years it has become more clear what international organizations
are and what common legal characteristics they have. There is unity within
diversity. It is therefore no coincidence that the International Law Commission
has now been able to reach agreement on a definition of international
organizations, in the context of its work on articles on the Responsibility of
International Organizations (ARIO).11 In addition, there is a growing body of
rules and principles that are applicable to international organizations in general.
7. One sub-area that has become much more important in recent years is
the external relations of international organizations. External relations are
important for NATO, partly because of the rise of out of area operations since
the 1990s. For the success of Operation Unified Protector in Libya in 2011,
cooperation with the U.N. and with non-member states such as Qatar was
important.12 NATO currently has a well-developed network of relations with
third countries and international organizations. The same is true for many other
international organizations. Existing international organizations are increasingly
incapable of performing their functions in isolation. Just as long-ago states could
no longer perform their state functions in isolation and started to cooperate
within international organizations, nowadays many international organizations
can no longer fulfil their mandate by working with the members only. In
addition, there is an increased need for many international organizations to
involve NGOs, private enterprises and other entities in their work; cooperation
with these outside entities is often necessary for achieving an organization’s
objectives. This rationale for establishing partnerships is often mentioned by
international organizations. Examples can be found in the area of U.N.
peacekeeping and on the websites of specialized agencies such as the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United States (FAO), “eradicating hunger is a
challenge that FAO cannot … face alone” and the World Meteorological
Organization (WMO), “[n]o single government or agency has the necessary
resources to address all the challenges on its own.”13
10

Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. Rep. 151, 168 (July 20).
See G.A. Res. 66/100, annex art. 2 (Dec. 9, 2011).
12
Ivo H. Daalder & James G. Starvridis, NATO’s Victory in Libya: The Right Way to Run an Intervention,
91 FOREIGN AFF. 2, 2–4 (2012).
13
U.N. Secretary-General, Partnering for Peace: Moving Towards Partnership Peacekeeping, ¶ 57, U.N.
11
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8. All these new developments, for NATO and for other international
organizations, raise legal issues and challenges. Three topics will be briefly
discussed below: responsibility, immunity, and accountability. First of all:
responsibility of international organizations. This topic has different
dimensions. One is related to the increase in cooperation between international
organizations. Such cooperation is first and foremost a necessary and positive
development. However, it also entails certain risks, such as what may be called
the “passing of the buck problem.” If third parties—states or individuals—suffer
from the cooperation between international organizations and if it is not clear
who is responsible, this may in the end backfire on international organizations
and their cooperation.
Another dimension is the division of responsibility between the organization
and its member states. It is a key principle in the ARIO that international
organizations are responsible for their own acts: “Every internationally wrongful
act of an international organization entails the international responsibility of that
organization,” not “…of its members.”14 This fundamental rule must be taken
seriously and should not be undermined. In the relationship between
responsibility of international organizations and responsibility of their members,
responsibility of the organization is the rule; member state responsibility is the
exception. In his fourth report for the International Law Commission, Special
Rapporteur Gaja, gave an overview of the relevant practice and views in
literature, which led him “to the conclusion that only in exceptional cases could
a State that is a member of an international organization incur responsibility for
the internationally wrongful act of that organization.”15 This area of the
responsibility of international organizations is an area in which there is
considerable recent practice and in which the law is now developing. It is
important for NATO, since its operations may lead to claims and since it should
be clear to victims how such claims should be presented and how the
responsibility between NATO and its members is divided.
Doc. S/2015/229 (Apr. 1, 2015) (“We have thus entered an era of “partnership peacekeeping,” … “no single
organization can effectively address increasingly complex, multifaceted peace and security challenges on its
own, whether at the subregional, regional or global level. Responding to those challenges has increasingly been
and must be a joint endeavor”); Who We Are, FAO. OF THE U.S., http://www.fao.org/about/who-we-are/en/;
Partnerships, WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORG., https://public.wmo.int/en/our-mandate/how-we-do-it/
partnerships; Niels Blokker, On the Nature and Future of Partnerships in the Practice of International
Organizations, 13 INT’L ORGS. L. REV. 21 (2016).
14
G.A. Res. 66/100, supra note 11, art. 3 (emphasis added).
15
Giorgio Gaja (Special Rapporteur on Responsibility of International Organizations), Fourth Rep. on
Responsibility of International Organizations, ¶ 96, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/564 and Add. 1–2 (Feb. 28, Apr. 12, and
Apr. 20, 2006) reproduced in 2 YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 124 (2006).
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9. A second important topic is the immunity of international organizations.
Most organizations enjoy absolute immunity from the jurisdiction of national
courts of their members, “immunity from every form of legal process.”
Nevertheless, national courts have sometimes ignored these provisions, partly
under the influence of case law of the European Court of Human Rights, in cases
in which the complaining individual did not have any legal remedy.16 This
happened in particular—although not only—in cases brought by former staff
members against their organization.17 As a result, international organizations
have taken their own internal complaints procedures more seriously.18 NATO is
a good example. The creation of NATO’s own administrative tribunal is fully in
line with international developments in this area.19 The availability of the NATO
Administrative Tribunal should be taken into account by national courts,
whenever it would happen that former NATO staff would bring a case against
NATO before a national court, and NATO would claim immunity.
In 2013, a conference was organized at Leiden University in which
academics and practitioners discussed the immunity of international
organizations.20 The then legal adviser of NATO, Peter Olson, also contributed
to this conference.21 One of the important conclusions of the conference was that
there is no need for a complete overhaul of the current regime of immunity rules
of international organizations.22 It is true that there are sometimes violations of
these rules and that there is some criticism. However, this does not seem to
require a fundamental change of the existing rules. Rather here and there, some
updates and adaptations are necessary, such as improved judicial protection for
staff. Examples include the new NATO Administrative Tribunal and the new
U.N. system of “administration of justice” or improving alternative remedies for
private law disputes.23 Another conclusion is related to the role of national
16
See generally European Court of Human Rights, INT’L JUSTICE RES. CENTER, https://ijrcenter.org/
european-court-of-human-rights/.
17
See Niels Blokker, Foreward in Special Issue: Immunity of International Organizations, 10 INT’L
ORGS. L. REV. 255 (2014) [hereinafter Special Issue].
18
Philippa Webb, Should the 2004 U.N. State Immunity Convention Serve as a Model/Starting point for
a Future U.N. Convention on the Immunity of International Organizations? in Special Issue supra note 17 at
329, 336.
19
See NATO Administrative Tribunal, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, (June 14, 2019),
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_114072.htm.
20
See generally Special Issue supra note 17.
21
See Peter Olson, Immunities of International Organizations: A NATO View in Special Issue, supra note
17 at 419.
22
See Niels Blokker & Nico Schrijver, Afterwords in Special Issue, supra note 17 at 601–04.
23
See NATO Administrative Tribunal, supra note 19; About the System, ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE AT
THE U.N.: U.N. INTERNAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, https://www.un.org/en/internaljustice/overview/about-the-
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courts. In the conference, six case studies were done dealing with the position of
national courts in Austria, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the
U.K.24 It is clear that in particular the courts in Belgium and Italy at times have
been reluctant to accept the immunity of international organizations.25 But
overall, the conclusion seemed to be that national courts in most cases respect
this immunity.26 At the same time, it has been recognized that in some cases,
national court judgments have performed a useful function as a sort of “wake up
call,” when international organizations did not or only minimally provided for
alternative remedies and where claimants would otherwise have left emptyhanded.27
10. Finally, there is the broad, overarching topic of accountability of
international organizations, which is not unrelated to responsibility and
immunity of international organizations, as discussed supra. This is a popular
topic; it is not easy to find conferences about international organizations which
do not discuss issues related to the accountability of international organizations.
Nevertheless, it is more than that. This topic started to receive more attention
since the 1990s, when international organizations became more active than
before and the awareness increased that their activities affect more and more our
daily life, directly or indirectly. This process started earlier, but it intensified
beginning in the 1990s, and when it was more recognized as a fundamental
development. If we look at this development from the perspective of individuals,
it is not difficult to understand why “the accountability of international
organizations” has become a hotly debated topic. For the individual, it does not
make a difference if his or her rights are affected or violated by a state or by an
international organization.
International organizations perform a great variety of activities, which may
affect third parties. This is necessary and inevitable. Unfortunately, sometimes

system.shtml.
24
See Kristen Schmalenbach, Austrian Courts and the Immunity of International Organizations in
Special Issue, supra note 17 at 446–63; Eric de Brabandere, Belgian Courts and the Immunity of International
Organizations in Special Issue, supra note 17 at 464–504; Beatric Bonafe, Italian Courts and the Immunity of
International Organizations in Special Issue, supra note 17 at 505–37; Thomas Henquet, The Jurisidictional
Immunity of International Organizations in the Netherlands and the View from Strasbourg in Special Issue,
supra note 17 at 538–71; Chanaka Wickremasinghe, The Immunity of International Organizations in the United
Kingdom in Special Issue, supra note 17 at 434–45.
25
See Eric de Brabandere, supra note 24; Beatric Bonafe, supra note 24.
26
See generally Special Issue supra note 17.
27
See generally Niels Blokker, Foreward in Special Issue, supra note 17, at 255–57; Kirsten
Schmalenbach, supra note 24.

BLOKKERPROOFS2_10.24.19

2019]

NATO AS AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

10/28/2019 1:55 PM

35

things go wrong. This is also inevitable. However, international organizations
sometimes find it difficult to react proactively and professionally whenever
things go wrong or are seen to be wrong. This is not inevitable. One example is
the accusations of sexual exploitation and abuse by French soldiers in 2014 in
the Central African Republic.28 A Swedish U.N. staff member criticized the U.N.
for not acting swiftly and disclosed a confidential U.N. report to French
prosecutors.29 The whistleblower was suspended and Sweden threatened to
publicly blame the U.N. for how it was dealing with the situation.30
All of these developments contribute to a climate that is more critical and
sometimes negative towards international organizations. This is the opposite of
the prevailing climate after World War II, when international organizations were
almost seen as panaceas. At the time, whenever a new international problem was
identified, the close to automatic answer was the creation of an international
organization to deal with the problem.31 A specific recent example of such a
changing attitude towards international organizations concerns the International
Criminal Court (ICC). There was much enthusiasm when the ICC was
established in 1998.32 After decades of dreaming and negotiating, it was possible
to create a permanent international criminal court, to end impunity for the
perpetrators of the most serious international crimes. However, the climate has
now completely changed. There is now a lot of criticism of the ICC, and not
only in Africa.33 In my view, this criticism is not always well founded, neither
in the case of the ICC nor with respect to most other international organizations.
It resembles the swing of the pendulum: from unreasonable expectations in the
beginning to popular criticism a few years later, sometimes because the new
institution does not seem to be doing what it was created for—like the U.N.
Security Council post 1945—or sometimes precisely because it is doing exactly
what it was created for—like the ICC and the arrest warrant for Sudanese
President Bashir.34

28
See UN Whistleblower Resigns over French Peacekeeper “Child Abuse,” BBC NEWS https://www.bbc.
com/news/world-africa-36481372 (last visited July 13, 2019).
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Adapting to Change: Transcript supra note 8 at 277.
32
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Overview, UNITED NATIONS, http://legal.un.org/
icc/general/overview.htm.
33
See Daniel Robinson, Inescapable Dyads: Why the International Criminal Court Cannot Win, 28
LEIDEN J. OF INT’L L. 323 (2015).
34
See Al Bashir Case, ICC, https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir#2.
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These are times full of criticism of international organizations. This also
affects NATO as an international organization. Criticism of NATO may
sometimes be part of the more general criticism of international organizations,
and there is little that NATO can do about it. Nevertheless, there may also be
criticism that is “NATO specific.” NATO and its members can and should be
prepared for this type of criticism. For example, operation Unified Protection in
Libya in 2011 is generally seen, certainly within NATO, as a highly successful
operation.35 Therefore, it is perhaps understandable that many in NATO were
outraged and upset when in late 2011 the Libya Inquiry Commission of the U.N.
Human Rights Council sent a letter to NATO asking for information about the
operation.36 How could NATO violate human rights? It was carrying out this
operation precisely to stop severe human rights violations in Libya. The NATO
reaction was rather defensive, and the Commission of Inquiry criticized NATO
for not giving all the necessary information.37 However, in the current era of
accountability, this became an issue in which NATO was criticized harshly for
in the media.38 There are other examples, such as the unfortunate bombing of a
passenger train crossing a bridge in Serbia in 1999, which NATO was widely
blamed for.39 It is necessary to react effectively in such cases. NATO and NATO
lawyers should try as much as possible to limit any “legal fallout,” or “legal
collateral damage.” Additionally, NATO and NATO lawyers should do as much
“legal collateral damage control” as possible. In order to be able to do so, they
need the full support of NATO member states—and their legal advisers—who
should be giving the necessary information, who should be actively helping to
deal with criticism and claims, and who should, in short, organize within NATO
an “accountability strategy.” In the long run this is in the best self-interest of
NATO and its member states. I have no doubt that the intensified external
orientation of the NATO legal community will be helpful in this context, as it
will contribute to a better understanding within NATO of the outside legal world
and to a better understanding in the outside legal world of NATO.

35
See Human Rights Council, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/19/68, annex II (Mar. 8, 2012).
36
See id.
37
See id. at 16–18.
38
See NATO’s Duty, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2012, at A26.
39
See NATO Attack on Train Kills Ten, INDEPENDENT, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/nato-attackon-train-kills-ten-1086871.html.

